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Abstract
Digital platforms, such as Google and Facebook, are under increased scrutiny as 
regards their impact on society. Having prompted concerns about their capacity to 
spread misinformation, contribute to filter bubbles and facilitate hate speech, much 
attention has been paid to the threat platforms pose to democracy. In contrast to 
existing interventions considering the threats posed by interactions between platforms 
and users, in this article, I examine platforms’ impact on the democratic work of other 
bodies. Considering the relationship between platforms and the media, I reveal how 
platforms affect journalists’ ability to advance their democratic goals. Using a case 
study of journalistic coverage of digital campaigning at the 2019 UK general election, I 
show how platforms have hindered journalistic efforts to inform citizens and provide 
a watchdog function. These findings are significant for our understanding of platforms’ 
democratic impact and suggest policy makers may wish to regulate platforms’ inter-
institutional impact upon democracy.
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Introduction
Digital platforms play a dominant role in contemporary society. As Van Dijck et al. 
(2018) have argued, today ‘social and economic traffic is increasingly channelled by an 
(overwhelmingly corporate) global online platform ecosystem that is driven by algo-
rithms and fuelled by data’ (p. 4). These platforms have ‘leveraged their position to take 
on an ever-greater number of quasi-public functions, exercising new forms of unaccount-
able, transnational authority’ (Cobbe and Bietti, 2020). As their position in society has 
grown, increased attention has been paid to platforms’ impact upon democracy. In the 
realm of news media, particular focus has been paid to mis- and disinformation, filter 
bubbles, echo chambers, hate speech, junk news and the abuse of market power (Deibert, 
2019; Kuehn and Salter, 2020; Omidyar, 2018; Tenove, 2020). Faced with these trends, 
governments around the globe have begun to pursue regulation and oversight (Rochefort, 
2020), and yet, there are unanswered questions about what precisely should be regulated 
and how regulation should be designed.
In this article, I engage with current debates about platforms’ impact on democracy to 
argue there is a need to consider what I describe as platforms’ inter-institutional impact 
upon democracy. In contrast to existing interventions which have pointed to the demo-
cratic harms arising from interactions between users and platforms (Miller and Vaccari, 
2020), I focus on the impact platforms have on other institutions’ democratic activities. 
Building on the idea that platforms occupy an intermediary role that shapes society, I 
examine the ways in which platforms affect other actors’ ability to pursue favoured dem-
ocratic ideals. This analysis offers important insights into the expansive impact of plat-
forms on societal manifestations of democracy and suggests policy makers may wish to 
regulate platforms’ inter-institutional impact upon democracy.
To make this intervention, I employ a case study approach. Dissecting relations 
between platforms and the media, I consider the democratic ideals pursued by journal-
ists, and the impact platforms have on journalists’ ability to enact these ideals. Presenting 
evidence from interviews exploring journalists’ experience of covering the United 
Kingdom’s 2019 digital election campaign, I show that while some platform practices 
enabled journalists to pursue their democratic objectives, others fundamentally inhibited 
their efforts to inform citizens and provide a watchdog function. Pointing specifically to 
issues around data availability and quality, I show how platforms’ status as intermediary 
bodies shapes the democratic activities of other bodies. On this basis, I argue that policy 
makers may wish to consider regulating such effects and, drawing specific insights from 
this case, propose particular interventions.
Platforms, democracy and inter-institutional impacts
Digital platforms or, as Gillespie (2010) defines them, intermediary bodies that offer 
‘storage, navigation and delivery of the digital content of others’ (p. 348) have been the 
subject of extensive study (Gillespie, 2018; Helmond, 2015). While it is widely recog-
nised that platforms such as Facebook, Airbnb, YouTube, Google and Amazon play a 
role within ‘virtually all aspects of contemporary life’ (Gorwa, 2019: 854; Poell et al., 
2019: 1–2; Van Dijck et al., 2018), in recent years, there has been concern about the 
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impact of these organisations on democracy (Deibert, 2019; Persily, 2017). The charges 
levelled at platforms have been numerous and diverse. It has been argued that platforms 
create filter bubbles (Pfetsch, 2018), polarise communities (Butcher, 2018), disseminate 
mis- and disinformation (Tucker et al., 2018), and much besides.
In the context of debates around news media, platforms have been shown to have 
particular disruptive force. Tambini and Labo (2016) have, for example, described plat-
forms as ‘the new power brokers, usurping dominance of multiple media markets, grab-
bing control of complex ecologies of advertising and personal information and potentially 
even undermining democracy’ (p. 34). To date, efforts to understand and respond to the 
democratic threats platforms pose to society have focused on the relationship between 
platform practices and users (Miller and Vaccari, 2020; Van Dijck, 2013: 20), highlight-
ing negative democratic outcomes. Studies showing how, for example, platforms are 
changing patterns of news consumption among citizens (Bakshy et al., 2015) and plat-
form algorithms are filtering news content to different audiences (DeVito, 2017; Thorson 
et al., 2021) have been cited as evidence of platforms threat to democracy (Andersen and 
Strömbäck, 2021; Vaidhyanathan, 2018). Others have explored platforms role in dis-
seminating news, highlighting their capacity to expose citizens to hate speech (Whitten-
Woodring et al., 2020) or junk news (Howard, 2020), and to undermine journalists’ 
ability to protect citizens from misinformation (Pickard, 2020). In the face of such evi-
dence, governments have begun to take steps to mitigate these outcomes, proposing and 
implementing regulation intended to ‘make them [platforms] more responsible’ (Loutrel, 
2019: 11; Deibert, 2019: 25–26; Rahman, 2018) and to mitigate harmful effects (Flew 
et al., 2019; Taddeo and Floridi, 2016).
While making important strides in developing our understanding and informing regu-
latory response, in this article, I argue there is value in expanding inquiry to spotlight 
platforms’ impact on other institutions within democratic systems. This approach draws 
insights from institutional theory and platform studies to foreground the interconnections 
and power relations that exist between institutions and their significance for democracy. 
Within institutional theory, it is commonly asserted that institutions as both organisations 
(such as platforms or governments) and rules, norms and strategies (Ostrom, 1986) give 
meaning to social practices and ideals by defining expectations for behaviour (Streek and 
Thelen, 2005: 12–13). Institutions therefore play a pivotal role in shaping the ‘political 
values which prevail at a given time in a society’ (Johnson, 1975: 282), rendering their 
activities key to the meaning of ideas such as democracy. In understanding how such 
ideas are defined, it is important to recognise that ‘no institution stands alone, but is 
interconnected with a range of other institutions which reinforce its effects, or comple-
ment them’ (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013: 42).1 To understand an ideal such as democ-
racy, it is therefore necessary to consider the interactions between institutions and the 
shared ideals they promote (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Napoli, 2014).
Aligned with this approach, scholars of platform studies have also focused on institu-
tional interconnections, but in this field, attention has tended to focus on the disruptive 
power of platforms. Highlighting platforms’ status as intermediary bodies that ‘shape 
cultural worlds’ (Bourdieu, 1984; Lobato, 2016), it has been argued that platforms ‘have 
now acquired a scale and indispensability . . . such that living without them shackles 
social and cultural life’ (Plantin and Punathambekar, 2019: 164). Platforms are seen to 
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occupy a dominant position, with scholars highlighting how ‘informational asymmetry’ 
between platforms and other actors within society makes it possible for platforms to 
‘leverage their position as powerful intermediaries to engage in practices likely to reduce 
economic and social welfare’ (Tessier et al., 2017: 180–181).
Applying these insights to study the impact of platforms on news media, scholars 
have tended to focus on platforms’ structural rather than democratic impacts, arguing 
that platforms are ‘profoundly changing our media environment’ (Bell and Owen, 2017; 
Nielsen and Ganter, 2018: 1600). Caplan and boyd (2018) have therefore demonstrated 
how platforms are upending ‘how both the newsroom and individual journalists operate’ 
(p. 2) when producing and disseminating news. Similarly, Messe and Hurcombe (2020) 
have highlighted ‘platform dependency’ by showing news media organisations to be 
‘dependent on platforms (and their algorithms) for audience traffic’ (p. 2). These exam-
ples suggest that platforms are ‘the new dominant actors’ (Siapera, 2013: 2) and can exert 
‘both formal and in-formal pressures’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 150) on dependent 
bodies within society. Indeed, for some scholars, platforms have the capacity to ‘capture’ 
the media by rendering them ‘incapable of operating sustainably without [platforms’] 
physical or digital resources’ (Nechushtai, 2018: 1052).
Entwining these analytical traditions, in this article, I spotlight the significance of 
institutions for our understanding of democracy and, noting the dominant position plat-
forms can occupy vis-à-vis other institutions, consider their potential impact on demo-
cratic ideals and practices. Pointing to the significance of collective institutional practices 
for our understanding of democracy, I ask whether and how platforms are disrupting 
other institutions’ ability to enact their democratic goals. To do so, I offer a case study of 
relations between platforms and the media. While not allowing analysis of platforms’ 
impact upon the multitude of institutions that shape ideas of democracy within a particu-
lar society, this approach facilitates fine-grained inquiry that makes it possible to inves-
tigate precisely how platforms frustrate or enable the media’s democratic goals. This 
study therefore offers insights for those interested in platform or media relations, while 
more broadly seeking to contribute a new perspective to debates about platforms, democ-
racy and regulation.
Case study and method
The relationship between democracy and the media is a long-standing topic of interest 
within academia. Acting as the ‘fourth estate’ of democratic politics (Schultz, 1998), 
scholars have argued that the media play a vital role in advancing democratic ideals, and 
have offered a number of different classifications of their activities (Christians et al., 
2009: 116; Gurevitch and Blumler, 1990). Rather than selecting one pre-existing schema, 
within this article, I follow a well-established tradition of self-declaration (Rollwagen 
et al., 2019), asking journalists to articulate their own understanding of their democratic 
role.
Adopting this approach, it is important to note that a study of this type confronts chal-
lenges. Previous scholarship has shown that while journalistic ideals can be easily identi-
fied, they are often divorced from actual practices (Schudson, 2008). Indeed, Anderson 
(2020) has argued that the economic and social conditions surrounding news make it 
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problematic to ‘hold up grand expectations for the news profession’ (p. 2). This makes it 
important not to create the illusion that the media enacted democratic ideals in the pre-
platform era. The process of realising democratic objectives has always confronted a 
range of challenges, but these ideals nevertheless provide an important guide for journal-
istic behaviour. In studying the impact of platforms upon the media’s democratic goals, 
this analysis does not therefore claim that these ideals have always been enacted, or that 
they would be secured if platforms did not exist (or changed), rather I isolate the particu-
lar barriers that platforms create and in so doing, highlight the power platforms have to 
enable or frustrate journalists’ efforts.
To facilitate analysis, I present a case study focused on the media’s experience of 
covering the digital election campaign at the 2019 UK general election. This narrow lens 
allows me to unpick the particular interactions between platforms and journalists, allow-
ing discussion to move beyond generalised observations. While a range of scenarios 
could have been examined, a focus on digital campaigning is of particular interest as to 
date attention has focused on the need to mitigate democratically harmful practices ena-
bled by platforms. There is accordingly a high degree of consensus about the need to 
regulate platforms to tackle digital misinformation, foreign interference and voter sup-
pression in order to defend democracy (Tenove, 2020). Less attention has, however, been 
paid to the significance of platform behaviour for the democratic activity of other institu-
tions. Indeed, there has been limited focus on why platform practices matter for other 
institutions’ democratic activities and what regulatory interventions might be required. 
This case study offers such insights, spotlighting the significance of platforms’ inter-
institutional impact on the media and the significance of these trends for democracy.
The analysis below is based on interviews conducted with 16 journalists in the imme-
diate aftermath of the UK general election (December 2019/January 2020). Interviews 
explored views and experiences from a range of different outlets, with participants 
selected from three national broadcasters, three newspapers and three online only news 
outlets (Table 1). As the BBC invested particularly heavily in digital across its online, 
radio and television coverage, a number of interviews were conducted in this organisa-
tion. Participants were identified as senior reporters or data journalists with responsibil-
ity for leading an outlet’s coverage. In some cases, chain referral was used to speak to an 
additional specialist within the organisation with particular expertise.
Interviews focused on each outlets’ approach to covering the digital campaign, and 
explored the type of coverage they sought to offer citizens, the precise mechanics and 
focus of their coverage, gaps, barriers and strengths within their approach. Questions 
were exploratory in nature and answers have subsequently been recoded and analysed to 
explore the ideas raised above using an iterative, reductive coding process. The findings 
presented here do not aim to compare and contrast different reporting strategies, but 
rather highlight common experiences around platform influence. Interviews were con-
ducted on the record in all but one case; hence, the names and affiliations of the majority 
of participants are given in the discussion below (and listed in Supplemental Appendix 
1). It should be noted that these affiliations reflect positions interviewees held during the 
election, and that a number of participants have since gone onto other jobs. Quotes also 
reflect platform behaviour in the election period, but clarifications have been offered to 
highlight policy changes made after December 2019. Interviews were conducted by 
6 new media & society 00(0)
phone and lasted between 30 minutes to an hour, they were transcribed and quotes have 
been approved by interviewees.
Journalistic coverage of digital campaigning at the 2019 
general election 
At the 2019 UK general election, digital campaigning was given unprecedented levels of 
coverage. All but one of the outlets studied had reporters devoted to digital campaigning, 
and many had multi-person teams composed of reporters and data scientists. When inter-
viewees were asked about the motivation behind their reporting nearly all expressed a 
desire to inform citizens and hold powerful actors to account (Dahl, 1991).
Many journalists articulated their intent to inform citizens about what was happening 
online. Interviewees made comments such as a ‘really important goal was to inform 
people’, recognising that it is easy to ‘assume the general public know about things like 
targeting of ads, but actually the fact is they don’t’ (Joe Tidy, BBC). This activity involved 
working to promote citizens’ understanding of digital activity. Rory Cellan-Jones at the 
BBC therefore described his desire to draw ‘back the veil on this mysterious and alleg-
edly incredibly powerful form of campaigning, just to tell people how it’s done’, while 
Rowland Manthorpe at Sky talked about conveying ‘what is really going on in the digital 
campaign’. Michael Wendling, also of the BBC, reflected that journalists’ ‘job is to try 
and describe [what is happening on digital], try and analyse it and provide some sort of 
clear thinking about it, but also try to humanise it a bit’. These comments reflect the well-
established idea that journalists ‘play an important democratic role in informing citizens’ 
(Gans, 1998: 6, 2003; Lippman, 1922; McNair, 2000; Nielsen, 2017; Schultz, 1998), but 
they also show journalists to be advancing a specific conception of democracy that pro-
motes the idea of knowledgeable citizens.
In addition to informing citizens, a number of interviewees also cited a desire to hold 
powerful actors to account by performing a ‘watchdog’ function (Norris, 2014). Joe Tidy 
at the BBC reflected on the importance of ‘the investigative side of it as well: “Let’s 
make sure that we don’t miss some nasty scandal happening here that the public aren’t 
aware of”’. These ideas were reflected by Rupert Evelyn at ITV and Alex Spence at 
BuzzFeed who commented on their desire to uncover concerning practices and hold 
campaigners to account. Such motivations reflect Deuze’s (2008) assertion that the 
media play an important democratic role in monitoring the ‘bureaucracy, industries, and 
the state . . . from a slightly elevated or professionally distant vantage point’ (p. 850; 
Jacobs and Schillemans, 2016: 23), establishing ‘an additional layer of protection against 
Table 1. Interview distribution.
National broadcaster Newspaper Online only outlet
BBC 6 Guardian 1 BuzzFeed 1
Sky 3 Telegraph 1 Politico 1
ITV 1 Financial Times 1 First draft 1
BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation.
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potential detriments of injustices against citizens’ (Lohmann and Riedl, 2019: 219). In 
the remainder of the article, I analyse interview data to consider whether and how plat-
forms affected journalists’ ability to enact these goals.
In reviewing interview findings, it appeared that platforms were key to journalistic 
coverage. Speaking about their desire to report on ‘paid for’ and ‘organic’ content,2 jour-
nalists reflected that while some content could be studied on digital campaigners’ own 
websites and blogs, for the most part, content was placed on intermediary platforms such 
as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp, Reddit, TikTok, Snapchat, mes-
saging apps, Google, Telegraph and Gab. Pointing initially to the positive role that plat-
forms could play, interviewees explained how tools provided by platforms facilitated 
their work.
In terms of paid content, journalists routinely mentioned the value of the online 
advertising archives provided by some platforms. They explained how the decision by 
Google and Facebook to create these resources in 2018 provided previously unavaila-
ble insight into advertising spend, content and targeting (Leerssen et al., 2019: 2). 
Facebook, in particular, was seen ‘to their credit, to have made it very easy for people 
and journalists to access’ information (Jim Waterson, Guardian). Indeed, Joe Tidy at 
the BBC described how across these two forms of content, ‘[t]he Facebook Ad Library, 
coupled with the Google Ad Library, Snapchat’s new ad policy tracker and transpar-
ency . . . gave us pretty good insight into what was happening’. Meanwhile, for organic 
content, journalists cited the significance of platform tools such as CrowdTangle which 
provide metrics on organic activity such as account likes, shares and comments on dif-
ferent platforms. Describing the use of these tools, Joe Tidy at the BBC explained how 
BBC Monitoring used CrowdTangle to identify ‘the most politically engaged people in 
the population’, while Alex Spence at BuzzFeed similarly noted that the tool allowed 
him to gain a ‘sense of the ecosystem around British politics’. The availability of these 
tools is particularly notable because of the insight they provide into previously opaque 
aspects of campaign activity. In comparison to the challenge of studying offline cam-
paigning (where archives of campaigning materials are not available), platform tools 
allowed journalists unprecedented insight into campaigns. In many ways, platforms 
therefore enabled rather than frustrated journalists’ ability to enact their democratic 
goals, and yet, when talking in more detail about their experiences, interviewees high-
lighted numerous ways in which the decisions made by platforms around disclosure 
had a detrimental impact on their ability to inform citizens and hold powerful actors to 
account.
Assessing platforms’ inter-institutional impact: limitations 
in information disclosure
Discussing their experiences, interviewees revealed considerable evidence of ‘informa-
tional asymmetry’ between platforms and journalists (Tessier et al., 2017: 180). Two 
primary concerns were voiced, first pertaining to data availability, and second to data 
quality; with specific concerns about the scope, functionality, precision and accuracy of 
data that were provided.
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Data availability limitations
First, reflecting on paid for and organic activity, journalists reported many aspects of 
digital campaigning that could not be covered because of a lack of available data. As 
companies motivated by commercial objectives, most platforms have not been designed 
to facilitate external observation and analysis. Indeed, much of the architecture of plat-
form services makes it exceedingly difficult for an external observer to determine what 
is being done where (Kuehn and Salter, 2020: 2595). While platforms vary in their degree 
of transparency, and some have provided tools to enable external study, there were many 
types of digital campaigning that journalists found it challenging to cover. Thinking 
about paid content, interviewees reflected that while payments could be used to place 
adverts, promote posts and stories, or to purchase endorsements from influencers, data 
were only available on advertising content (and even this was provided by only certain 
platforms in inconsistent forms). This led to narrowly focused reporting. As one inter-
viewee explained, ‘Part of the reason why I was only really looking at Facebook ads is 
because the other platforms don’t really offer as much transparency as Facebook’. 
Although the platforms providing archives (i.e. Facebook and Google) do dominate the 
digital advertising landscape (Barrett, 2020), the availability of advertising data heavily 
skewed coverage towards certain platforms (and kinds of paid for content). Indeed, 
speaking about Instagram, Mark Scott at Politico noted that ‘Instagram was significantly 
under-covered. So, it was very difficult to see the specific Instagram ad spend on 
Facebook, because they don’t provide granularity on that’. Other platforms without pub-
lic archives also received less coverage, and few stories were published on other types of 
paid content. Platforms’ ability to provide these resources to journalists does vary in 
accordance with their size and the particular challenges of identifying and disclosing 
certain types of content (such as details of influencer payment). However, developments 
since these interviews show that platforms do have discretion to make more information 
available as, for example, Facebook made changes to allow advertising spend on 
Instagram to be disaggregated.
It was not only paid content where data availability affected coverage, journalistic 
insights on organic campaigning were also impacted. Interviewees cited many areas 
where data were simply not available. While some tools such as CrowdTangle exist for 
studying the size and reach of online groups and profiles on certain platforms, interview-
ees lamented a general lack of systematic access to information about organic content. It 
was widely recognised that, as Alex Spence at BuzzFeed noted, ‘the availability of good 
data . . . is a big problem with covering this area . . . it’s quite hard to get a holistic view’. 
Because platform companies facilitate activity in encrypted or closed forums, and do not 
provide external access to these forums, much organic activity was ‘completely off lim-
its’ (Mark Scott, Politico). As Shayan Saradarizadeh at the BBC reflected, ‘messaging 
apps are obviously end-to-end encrypted, and we have no way of monitoring that and 
checking that’. While some journalists did develop their own data gathering strategies – 
such as signing up to email lists, making donations and joining local groups – interview-
ees acknowledged that these methods were not systematic. Indeed, Mark Scott at Politico 
noted how trying to ‘pick out what’s trending or what’s going viral is impossible, because 
you don’t know what you can’t see’. Others noted ethical problems, explaining how ‘it’s 
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hard to look at private groups . . . Unless you say, “I’m a journalist can I come into your 
group?” then it’s subterfuge . . . you are on ethically shaky ground’.3 It was therefore 
seen to be challenging for journalists to access and verify organic campaigning activity 
because of the way platforms were designed. These challenges were particularly acute on 
marginal platforms ‘like Gab, Discord, Telegram just because they’re not as accessible. 
Because the tools to monitor them aren’t available in the same way’ (Alastair Reid, First 
Draft). As Alex Spence at BuzzFeed noted, ‘there’s this whole world of WhatsApp and 
what we call “dark social,” who knows what impact that had or the prevalence of sharing 
on those platforms’. The architecture of platforms and other digital media therefore cre-
ated barriers to studying organic campaigning, leading Jim Waterson at the Guardian to 
reflect that ‘journalists missed loads of stuff . . . I think everyone did too much on paid-
for ads and not enough on organic material’.
Journalists reliance on platforms’ voluntary disclosure of information therefore 
impacted on reporting. While it was possible for interviewees to report on certain aspects 
of the digital campaign using platform provided insights (such as online advertising 
archives), many topics were inaccessible. Although platforms were therefore providing 
some previously unavailable insight into campaigning, their decision not to disclose all 
information impacted journalists’ ability to inform citizens about the breadth of digital 
campaigning activity and hindered attempts to detect problematic activities and hold 
them to account. A complex picture therefore emerges in which platforms both extend 
previous capacities, but fail to fully realise their potential value.
Data quality limitations
Journalists also highlighted limitations with the quality of information platforms did 
provide. Speaking about available data, interviewees reflected that while valuable, there 
were limitations in data quality. Specific concerns were raised around the scope, func-
tionality, precision and accuracy of disclosed information. For the most part, concerns 
were voiced about Facebook and Google’s advertising archives, however some com-
ments relate to other social media metrics.
Scope. First, in relation to scope, many interviewees indicated that while some insight 
could be gathered through online advertising archives in particular, available information 
was by no means comprehensive. While Facebook and Snapchat were seen to provide 
more detail, there was a little consistency in the information disclosed, making it hard to 
develop a complete picture of what was happening online. Indeed, comparing Facebook 
and Google’s advertising archives, the latter was reported to contain far fewer insights 
because of Google’s narrower definition of a ‘political advert’ (Sosnovik and Goga, 
2021). As Carmen Aguilar Garcia at Sky explained, ‘there is no great consistency 
between providers in terms of how they actually provide the data, which could help data 
journalists’. Similarly, Rupert Evelyn at ITV reflected on his ‘frustration . . . in the dif-
ference between various social media organisations’, noting that ‘[s]ome sort of uniform-
ity would be helpful’.
In addition to inconsistent scope across platforms, journalists also cited areas where 
the more extensive archives fell down. Expanding on critiques made elsewhere (Mozilla, 
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2019), at the BBC Michael Wendling noted, ‘it was a frustration for a lot of journalists 
that we do not know how people are being targeted on Facebook – or any of the other 
platforms . . . We can only guess or try and piece together evidence’. Others noted the 
absence of constituency level ‘geographical information about where the ads were run-
ning’, or flagged a lack of topic labelling (Carmen Aguilar Garcia, Sky). For Mike Wright 
advertising archives were seen to provide,
just the barest amount of information. So, compared to what’s actually going on, take Facebook, 
they have this . . . The amount of data, and their whole business model is on the data, the intel, 
and what they can offer advertisers. We still have absolutely no idea what’s going on at 
Facebook, putting it bluntly. We have no idea what’s going on on Snapchat, we’ve no idea 
what’s going on on Google or YouTube, how these things are being used. There is absolutely 
no transparency, really, in any meaningful sense
For Mark Scott at Politico the limited scope of available data meant that while,
we should give the tech companies credit for at least providing some level of transparency . . . 
The fact that it’s still a black box in terms of all that private Facebook data and also the YouTube 
videos and the inability to check what actually is being said in those videos then, that’s a 
concern for me.
While advances were seen to have been made through the creation of advertising 
archives, the scope and consistency of available data did not reflect the full range of 
information platforms possessed. Although platforms were therefore making some new 
information available (e.g. around targeting, which is not available about offline cam-
paigning), companies were exerting discretion about the degree of information 
conveyed.
Functionality. Interviews also highlighted problems with the functionality of available 
resources. In regards to advertising archives, journalists recalled particular challenges in 
gaining access to the Facebook Application Programming Interface (API) – a tool that 
allows users to ‘perform customized keyword searches of ads stored in the Ad Library’. 
As Przemyslaw Pluta at Sky explained,
if you want to use an API, you have to provide quite a lot of details, especially if you’re a 
company, you actually have to give quite a lot of details in terms of who you are, where you are, 
what you intend to use the API for, etc.
In a few cases, access was not granted. Indeed, Carmen Aguilar Garcia at Sky explained 
how she did not get approval, noting ‘I uploaded a Spanish document, but then I was 
trying to get information from the UK. So, probably that causes some, I don’t know, 
mistakes or something in their system, so I didn’t get the approval’. This presented con-
siderable barriers to journalistic coverage, and in many cases, resulted in a lag in report-
ing as outlets had to apply to be given access before reporting could begin (a process that, 
for Facebook, took several weeks).
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Once having gained access, further challenges were reported around journalists’ abil-
ity to extract information from archives in desired formats. Mark Scott at Politico 
described how
the access to YouTube’s transparency tool is very difficult, because although you can download 
the data from the API, it doesn’t provide you with the metadata on what’s in the videos. So, you 
have to individually go through video by video to figure out what’s being said. And I just don’t 
have time for that.
Reflecting on the actual process of gathering data from the API at Facebook, Alastair 
Reid at First Draft explained how he needed to use scripts and that while,
there are public ones available that certain organisations have made. None of them are perfect 
and there are . . . some of them are gappy. Some of them return different results depending on 
when . . . you might think you’re accessing the same data but then you get the results. So it’s 
not perfect.
Similarly, Przemyslaw Pluta at Sky noted that the ‘amount of API requests you’re 
allowed to make is heavily limited which makes it difficult to build the full picture of 
available data and connections between moving parts’. These comments reveal that jour-
nalists faced a range of challenges in being able to access and query resources to produce 
informative insights (for more, see Edelson et al., 2018). For Rowland Manthorpe at Sky, 
they meant that ‘a normal, rational person trying to interact with it, you know, without 
years of experience, almost doesn’t stand a chance’. For some, these challenges reflected 
companies’ lack of interest in facilitating journalists’ democratic goals. Indeed, Mike 
Wright at the Telegraph described the archives as,
set up, basically, as PR exercises, to be blunt . . . They’re not set up to make it easy to find 
things . . . It does give us access to some data, but we have to try to chisel out from whatever 
medium the insight you can get from them.
Precision. Interviewees also highlighted concerns about data precision. In regards to 
advertising archives, peculiarities with Facebook and Google’s systems were seen to 
inhibit reporting. David Blood at the Financial Times recalled how ‘ad level data from 
the API, stuff like spending and the number of impressions per ad is banded. It’s not 
given in exact figures. So that makes it almost impossible for us to report on it’. Else-
where, Joe Tidy at the BBC noted that
Google’s Ad Library is bad. It’s very unhelpful. It’s very out of date . . . It doesn’t give you any 
accurate numbers on how much money is being spent or how many people are seeing it. The 
category bands they use are really wide and varied.
Similarly, Carmen Aguilar Garcia at Sky reflected that imprecise bands made ‘it difficult 
to precisely estimate the amount spent per sponsor. The workaround was using the daily 
report, but small spending was published as “<100” and this report was available for 
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only 24 hours’. While providing some insight, these data sources made it hard to report 
on trends with certainty.
These limitations were not just perceived with advertising archives, reflecting on 
social media metrics, such as data on the number of shares for particular YouTube and 
Twitter posts, Joey d’Urso at the BBC explained how ‘video metrics are by my under-
standing just broken. No one knows anything. The Twitter videos have 5 million views, 
what does that actually mean? It means someone’s just scrolled past it for a second?’ 
Such dynamics made it challenging to report on organic campaigning activity with con-
fidence as journalists were unable to verify whether reported statistics were reliable.
Inaccuracy. Journalists also reflected on the impact of inaccurate data. Reflecting on his 
experiences of working with advertising archives, Shayan Saradarizadeh at the BBC 
recalled how
midway through the campaign, we figured out that the information that Google’s transparency 
report gave us about digital ads was not entirely accurate. And they said, ‘Yeah, that is the case’. 
And then, a week later we find out that the Snapchat ad library has some inaccurate information. 
And we were like, ‘Okay, hang on a minute’. So, most of the stuff that we were seeing on those 
two are either completely inaccurate or the picture that we were starting to make for ourselves, 
now we have to scrap that.
Similarly, Alastair Reid at First Draft recalled how ‘days before polling day in the UK 
something like 70,000 ads just disappeared from the ad library, 40% of the whole UK archive 
just went with no communication from Facebook’. Interviewees repeatedly reflected that 
platform systems were ‘very patchy and buggy’ (Mark Scott, Politico), making it challenging 
to rely on this data for coverage. These ambiguities made working with archive data, as 
Rowland Manthorpe (Sky) described, ‘incredibly, incredibly, incredibly hard’. While some of 
these challenges may reflect an inherent difficulty in providing information in an accurate 
form, changes made by Snapchat post-election indicate that platforms are not powerless.
Highlighting these four limitations, it appears that while platforms have, in some 
areas, made information available to journalists that has facilitated their democratic 
goals, this is not uniformly the case. The limited scope, poor functionality, lack of preci-
sion and inaccuracies found within platform provided data mean, as Jim Waterson at the 
Guardian explained, that the data were viewed to be ‘just so bad’. These dynamics have 
direct implications for journalistic coverage, making it hard to evidence and verify sto-
ries, or to report on items with precision. In certain instances, reporters such as Rowland 
Manthorpe at Sky, described instances in which they had to abandon coverage ‘because 
the Facebook ad archive broke’ and stories could not be verified. Journalists’ ability to 
use platform data to inform citizens and/or hold powerful actors to account is therefore 
dependent to a significant extent on platform discretion.
Discussion and conclusion
The rise of digital platforms has posed a range of challenges to democracy and, in recent 
years, policy makers have taken steps to mitigate platforms’ democratic harms. In this 
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article, I sought to spotlight a particular way in which platforms can impact upon democ-
racy, focusing on their impact on the democratic work of other institutions. Drawing 
insights from institutional scholarship and platform studies, I examined the significance 
of platforms’ intermediary status for debates around democracy, focusing not on their 
impact on users, but on other bodies. Spotlighting the relationship between platforms and 
the media, this article used interviews with journalists to not only show that platforms are 
exerting an impact on journalists’ ability to advance their democratic objectives when 
reporting on digital campaigning, but also how this is being done. Highlighting the sig-
nificance of platform decisions around information disclosure I have shown how plat-
form practices in regards to data availability and quality constrain journalistic work. 
While in some areas, platforms have extended the range of information available to 
journalists, this analysis demonstrates that they have also made choices that limit jour-
nalists’ access to available data. Platform behaviour has therefore affected journalists’ 
ability to advance their democratic objectives of informing citizens and performing a 
watchdog function. This study therefore extends earlier analyses revealing platforms’ 
impact upon the media to show that platforms are not only affecting the media’s news 
production and dissemination strategies (Nielsen and Ganter, 2018), but also their ability 
to promote self-identified democratic goals. This study accordingly supports Nechushtai’s 
(2018) notion of ‘infrastructural capture’ by showing how journalists are reliant on digi-
tal platform infrastructure to enact their democratic goals.
In focusing on journalists’ experience, in this article, I considered relations between 
platforms and the media as an illustrative example of the way in which platforms could 
influence a range of institutions active within democracies. While it is important not to 
draw conclusions about the experience of other institutions from this case study, there are 
reasons to suggest that others have encountered similar constraints. In reflecting on their 
experience of monitoring digital campaigning, for example, academics (Dommett and 
Power, 2019), civil society organisations (Mozilla, 2019) and regulators (Ofcom, 2021) 
have expressed similar frustrations about the impact of platform practices on their activ-
ity. Indeed, Ofcom, the United Kingdom’s communications regulator, has reported simi-
lar issues with advertising archives, outlining ‘differences in datasets provided by the 
same platform, including observations in one dataset which do not appear in another 
from the same platform, and different totals of active ads on the same day for the same 
platform’ (Ofcom, 2021: 5). While further study is needed to explore the relationship 
between these frustrations and such actors’ democratic goals, these findings suggest that 
platforms exert similar influence over the democratic activity of a range of institutions, 
not just the media.
The analysis offered in this article provides further evidence that platforms are power-
ful intermediary bodies that are ‘shaping cultural worlds’, but it also reveals important 
nuances in how platform power is being wielded. Far from acting in ways that are uni-
formly antithetical to journalists’ democratic goals, platforms do facilitate some of their 
activity, and they do show signs of being willing to update and alter their practice. To 
give just one example, in January 2020, Facebook (2020) outlined steps to update the 
advertising library to ‘increase the level of transparency’ by allowing audience size to be 
viewed and enabling better search and filtering. This raises the possibility that platform 
practices can be aligned with other institutions’ democratic objectives, but this kind of 
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synergy should not be presumed. Given the potential for platform systems to be devel-
oped in a range of different democratic contexts and to promote alternative democratic 
ideals, a reliance on platform discretion appears problematic. Accordingly, there appears 
to be a need for democratic actors to develop mechanisms through which platform 
behaviour can be aligned with prevailing democratic ideals.
Advancing this logic, this article suggests that policy makers considering social 
media regulation need to not only address the democratic impact of platforms upon 
users (Van Dijck, 2013: 20), but also their impact on other institutions, such as the 
media. While it was not the objective of this article to outline specific policy responses, 
this case study offers some insight into how such regulation could be designed. In the 
case of digital campaigning, regulation could promote information disclosure to ensure 
that platforms’ power to decide what is or is not disclosed is minimised. Reflecting 
existing research that has identified a need for precision in calls for increased transpar-
ency (Dommett, 2020), there appears to be a need for clear and precise standards 
around the availability and quality of data, particularly with regard to the scope, func-
tionality, precision and accuracy of data. Such standards could specify not only what 
information is disclosed, but also how it is provided in order to actively facilitate 
journalistic activity.
Entwining a study of platforms, the media and democracy this article has made the 
case for thinking more expansively about platforms’ democratic impact. Pointing to the 
significance of platforms’ intermediary status, I have argued that these bodies have an 
important and yet often overlooked inter-institutional impact on democracy. By showing 
how platforms can affect other bodies and offering specific insights for regulation, this 
article has attempted to expand the scope of current discussions around platforms’ demo-
cratic significance. It is hoped that future research can build on this article by exploring 
how the democratic goals of other institutions are affected by platform behaviour, and by 
monitoring whether (and how) democratic objectives change in response to platform 
practices. It is also hoped that future research can identify and trace the impact of regula-
tory interventions designed to mitigate these kinds of impact to determine whether it is 
possible for policy makers to counter these effects.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Chris Anderson, Sam Power and Luke Temple for their invaluable 
comments on earlier versions of this draft. In addition, I’d like to thank the thoughtful reflections 
recieved from attendees of the IJPP conference in 2020. I’d also like to thank the anonymous jour-
nal reviewers for their particularly valuable insights in revising and improving this piece.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this 
article.
ORCID iD
Katharine Dommett  https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0624-6610
Dommett 15
Supplemental material
Supplemental material for this article is available online.
Notes
1. It should be noted that institutionalist theory is a broad tradition of inquiry characterised by 
many traditions of analysis, for more, see Hall and Taylor (1996).
2. By ‘paid for’ material interviewees meant activities such as online political advertising, spon-
sored posts and influencer campaigns, while ‘organic’ content referred to social media posts, 
shares, interactions, memes, stickers and videos that are produced without a budget.
3. The interviewee asked for this quote to be unattributed.
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